FREE ESSAY ON MACEDONIA: THE CRITICAL FIVE YEARS: 1945-1950

MACEDONIA: THE CRITICAL FIVE YEARS: 1945-1950

The critical five years: 1945-1950
Nonetheless the Slavo-Macedonians, with the backing of the newlyformed Tito regime in
Yugoslavia, kept up their efforts. Just a few days after the Varkiza agreement,
Slavo-Macedonian emigres from Greece formed, in Skopje, an Organisation named NOF
(National Liberation Front) and sent armed guerrilla bands back to the border areas of
Greek Macedonia. The activities of these bands attracted the criticism of the KKE, since
it was in conflict with the terms of the Varkiza agreement and gave the government forces
an excuse for applying severe measures to suppress them. 
However, when the Civil War began in 1946, the Slavo-Macedonians, returned to Greek
Macedonia in great numbers and joined the Greek Communist movement, while still retaining
their own Organisation, the NOF. To judge from the various collections of documents and
memoirs which have been published in Skopje, the Slavo-Macedonians -that is, the part of
the Slav-speaking population whose national consciousness was Slav-were fighting what
they saw at this time as a national liberation struggle for the Macedonians of the Aegean
in order to win their national rights. These rights were none other than the policy which
Yugoslavia was officially pursuing at this time and which was intended to incorporate the
Macedonian territories of both Greek and Bulgarian Macedonia into the Socialist Republic
of Macedonia. 
In the meantime, and while the outcome of the civil war in Greece still hung in the
balance, the Yugoslavs exerted unbearable pressure on their Bulgarian comrades in order
to blackmail them into ceding Bulgarian Macedonia to Yugoslavia. In the end, by the Bled
accords of 1947 Dimitrov agreed, in return for minor concessions, to acknowledge the
inhabitants of Bulgarian Macedonia (Pirin) as Macedonians and to pave the way for the
incorporation of the province of Pirin into the Socialist Republic of Macedonia. The
incorporation of Greek Macedonia would await the outcome of the civil war. 
The split between Stalin and Tito, which occurred suddently in the summer of 1948, upset
all the Yugoslavian calculations about playing a leading role in the Balkans using the
Macedonian question as the central lever. Bulgaria seized the opportunity to release
itself from the concessions it had made over the Macedonian question. It repudiated the
theory of the 'Macedonian nation' and drove the commissars from Skopje off its territory.
It then attempted to exploit the difficulties which the Yugoslavs were facing in order to
advance once more the pre-war slogan of an Independent and united Macedonia. This slogan
also served to increase the more general political pressure which the Soviet Union was at
that time exerting on Tito. 
The Moscow-Belgrade split, however, also had dramatic repercussions for Greek Macedonia.
The leadership of the KKE judged it to be expendient to fall into line with the Soviet
Union in attacking Tito and at the same time adopt its new policy towards Macedonia.
Thus, by decision of the 5th Plenum of the Central Committee, in January 1949, the KKE
revived the old pro-Bulgarian slogan of the independent and united Macedonia in the
framework of a future Balkan Communist Federation. 
This shift of policy had grave consequences for the course of military operations, since
the Yugoslavs, in order to protect their own rear, closed the border with Greece, which
until that time had been the main channel through which supplies had flowed to the
Communist forces in Greece. Some of the NOF supporters fled to Yugoslavian Macedonia,
where they settled. Later, when the armed conflict ended in August 1949, the remaining
masses of NOF supporters followed the other Greek political refugees into exile in the
countries of Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union. 
The final outcome of those five tragic years was that all the Slavo-Macedonians left
Greece. Yugoslavia, faced with the nightmarish prospect of a Soviet invasion, sought
support in the West, which opened up the way for the normalisation of relations with
Greece and the signing, in 1954, of a tripartite Balkan Pact of defensive alliance, to
which Turkey also was a member. 
The new circumstances led Yugoslavia to drop the territorial demands it had been putting
forward and to restrict itself to formal claims for the recognition of 'Macedonian'
minorities. These claims were, however, totally unsubstantiated, since the objective
conditions to justify them no longer existed. The KKE, on its part, soon realised the
enormous political cost of the decision taken by the 5th Plenum and reversed it with a
theoretical position involving the equality of the Slavo- Macedonians. However, since the
Slavo-Macedonians concerned were no longer in Greece, this position gradually lost force
and was officially abandoned with the categorical statement by General Secretary Harilaos
Florakis in Thessaloniki in September 1988 that for the KKE, there is no Macedonian
minority in Greece. 
Lastly, Bulgaria too dropped the slogan of a united Macedonia after the death of Stalin
in 1953. After a considerable amount of vacilliation -directly connected to the state of
Soviet-Yugoslav relations at any given time- Bulgaria also adopted the position that
there is no Macedonian nation and that consequently there can be no 'Macedonian' minority
in Bulgaria. 
As a conclusion, after the upheavals of the period 1940-50, the three sections of
Macedonia went over to licking their wounds and have since followed, peacefully, the
political, economic and social development of the countries to which they belong.