FREE ESSAY ON SPINOZA'S ETHICS, PART I PROPOSITION 33

SPINOZA'S ETHICS, PART I PROPOSITION 33

Baruch Spinoza believes the essence of God includes God's existence and discusses the
causality of God through his ontological work, Ethics. In Ethics, Spinoza is seeking a
method of truth through the perfect being. The essence of what that perfect being
expresses, using this method of truth, is God (i.e. the perfect being). In this essay I
am going to give a detailed account of Part I, Proposition 33 of Spinoza's book Ethics. 
Part I, Proposition 33 of Ethics states that things could not have been produced by any
other way or in any other order than is the case. This means that whatever does exist
could not exist in any other way or in any other manner then it already exists. It
certainly follows then, according to Spinoza that this proposition 33 follows from
Proposition 16 and 29. Proposition 16 states that, 
 From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinite things in infinite
ways [modis], (that is, everything that can come within the scope of infinite intellect).

Proposition 29 states that, 
Nothing in nature is contingent, but all things are from the necessity of the divine
nature determined to exist and to act in a definite way. 
According to Spinoza, this provides proof that all things have necessarily followed from
the nature of God (Proposition 16) and have been determined to exist and to act in a
definite way from the necessity of that nature (Proposition 29). For example this means
that I smoke cigarettes from the necessity of God's will, and furthermore cigarettes, a
cancer-causing agent, exist from God's will. I will now talk about Spinoza's further
conditions of Proposition 33.
In Note 1, Spinoza is developing that there can not be a contingency or possibility of a
thing existing because it either necessarily exists or is impossible for it to exist.
Spinoza believes that everything has a cause. If it has no cause it contributes to the
theory of doubt making a thing contingent. This lack of knowing, which makes a thing
contingent is a contradiction, and since all that we know is or isn't in existence. This
means that there can not be any contingency of or about anything. For example, this means
that it is possible for me to smoke without a reason. Spinoza responds to this criticism
that our idea of contingency is made up of our lack of knowledge or more blatantly our
own ignorance about the existence of that thing (i.e. we do not know the cause). 
In Note 2, Spinoza reiterates from his proof that a thing can not be anything different
then that which it is. Spinoza is careful to express that a thing is either perfect or
imperfect, and they are just the way they are necessarily. It follows from that, if a
thing was different from what it is already, God's will would have made that thing the
way it is and no other way necessarily. 
Spinoza responds to G.W. Leibniz's idea of the best of all possible worlds. Spinoza
points out that there is an absurdity in Leibniz's idea. Spinoza could say, How is it
possible for God to create the best of all possible worlds when God is the Universe? If
God could have created multiple worlds it would mean that there would have been two or
more Gods in existence. Obviously it could not be possible for there to be two or more
Gods since God is the Universe. Hence there are not two or more Gods in existence and a
thing can be no different then what that thing already is in its entirety. Moreover,
God's will and essence cause a thing and that makes the thing true to God. Furthermore,
if a thing is a perfect or imperfect (good or bad) thing it is that way already and no
thought to what could have been will make any difference. It is what it is. 
In conclusion, I have explained Proposition 33 and Note 1 and 2 of Part I of Spinoza's
Ethics. This essay shows that God created everything and that everything is the way it is
because of the nature of God to will it. Furthermore, God is everything and all causes
follow from God. 
Bibliography
Ariew and Watkins. Pg. 137.
Ariew and Watkins. Pg. 141.