FREE ESSAY ON THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS

THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS

Samuel P. Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations suggests that world politics is entering
a new phase. It is his hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in the New
World will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. Huntington believes that
the great divisions amongst humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be in
the cultural form. Nation states will still remain the most powerful actors in world
affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and
groups of different civilizations. Huntington states: The clash of civilizations will
dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines
of the future. Huntington suggests that the old groupings of the Cold War are no longer
relevant (First, Second and Third Worlds). He proposes a new grouping of countries, not
in terms of their political or economic systems or in terms of their level of economic
development but rather in terms of their culture and civilization.
Huntington defines civilizations as a cultural entity. Villages, regions, ethnic groups,
nationalities, and religious groups, all with distinct cultures at different levels of
cultural diversity. A civilization is thus the highest cultural grouping of people and
the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes
humans from other species. It is identified both by common objective elements, such as
language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective
self-identification of people. However of all the objective elements which define
civilizations, the most important he states is religion. The major civilizations in human
history have been closely identified with the world's greatest religions, and people who
share ethnicity and language but differ in religion may slaughter each other, as happened
in Lebanon, the former Yugoslavia, and the Subcontinent. The Clash of Rights categorizes
the major contemporary civilizations as follows: Sinic, a distinct Chinese civilization;
Japanese, a distinct civilization which was the offspring of Chinese civilization; Hindu,
the core of Indian civilization; Islamic, many distinct cultures existing within
including Arab, Turkic, Persian, and Malay; Orthodox, centered in Russia and separate
from Western Christendom; Western, associated with Christianity, Renaissance, Reformation
and Enlightenment; Latin America, a separate civilization closely affiliated with the
West but divided as to where it belongs in the West; and possibly African; as the North
and East coast are associated with Islam but the remainder have developed a sense of
distinct identity. See figure 1.1 included within.
Huntington also states civilization's identity will be increasingly important in the
future, and the world will be shaped in large measure by the interactions among seven or
eight major civilizations. In the New World the most prevalent, important, and dangerous
conflicts will not be between social classes, rich and poor, or other economically
defined groups, but between peoples belonging to different cultural entities. Tribal wars
and ethnic conflicts will occur within civilizations. An example of this behaviour can be
seen in various recent occurrences. In the Yugoslav conflicts, Russia provided diplomatic
support to the Serbs, and Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran and Libya provided funds and arms to
the Bosnians, not for reasons of ideology or power politics or economic interest but
because of cultural kinship. In sum, the key issues on the international agenda involve
differences among civilizations. Power is shifting from the long predominant West to
non-Western civilizations. Global politics has become multipolar and multicivilizational
and as the West attempts to assert its values and to protect its interests, non-Western
societies confront a choice. Huntington states: 
Some attempt to emulate the West and join with the West; while other Confucian and
Islamic societies attempt to expand their own economic and military power to resist and
to balance against the West. The central axis of post-Cold War world politics is thus the
interaction of Western power and culture with the power and culture of non-Western
civilizations.
At the end of the Cold War several maps were introduced as to how nation-states of the
world would exist. The first is of One World. This paradigm was based on the assumption
that the end of the Cold War meant the end of significant conflict in global politics and
the emergence of one harmonious world. The one harmonious world paradigm is clearly far
from reality to be a useful guide to the post-Cold War world. The second is of Two
Worlds. The us and them, but more commonly the rich (modern developed), and the poor
(traditional, underdeveloped or developing) countries. However the world is too complex
to be envisioned as simply divided economically between North and South or culturally
between east and West; perhaps the West and the Rest. The third paradigm is 184 States,
More or Less. It derives from the Realist concept of international relations and suggests
that states are the only important actors in world affairs and the relation among states
is one of anarchy, and hence to insure their survival and security, states invariably
attempt to maximize their power. This paradigm is more accurate, however it assumes that
all states perceive their interests in the same way and act in the same way. States
define their interests in terms of power but also in terms of values, culture, and
institutions presently influence how states define their interests. And finally the last
paradigm is Sheer Chaos. It stresses: the breakdown of governmental authority, the
breakup of states, the intensification of tribal, ethnic, and religious conflict, the
emergence of international criminal mafias, refugees multiplying into the tens of
millions, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, the
spread of terrorism, the prevalence of massacres and ethnic cleansing. The world may be
chaos but it is not totally without order. An image of universal and uniform anarchy
provides few clues for understanding the world.
Next, the book looks at V.S. Naipaul's theory of a universal civilization which can be
defined as the general cultural coming together of humanity and the increasing acceptance
of common values, beliefs, orientations, practices, and institutions by peoples around
the world. Naipaul's theory lies behind three general principles: first, most peoples in
most societies have a similar moral sense; second, civilized societies have cities and
literacy in common which distinguish them from primitive societies and barbarians; and
third, people generally share beliefs in individualism, market economies, and political
democracy, also know as the Davos Culture effect. However, Huntington and Ronald Dore put
forth a case of their own suggesting that there are two things, which are not constant
throughout the world, but are imperative in global communication and cooperation. These
aspects are language and religion as both are central elements of any culture or
civilization. The world's language is known to be English but Huntington argues this
assertion and states: 
The overall pattern of language use in the world did not change dramatically. Significant
declines occurred in the proportion of people speaking English, French, German, Russian,
and Japanese, that a smaller decline occurred in the proportion of people speaking
Mandarin, and that increases occurred in the proportion of people speaking Hindi,
Malay-Indonesian, Arabic, Bengali, Spanish, Portuguese, and other languages.
He believes that as the power of the West gradually declines relative to that of other
civilizations, the use of English and other Western languages in other societies and for
communications between societies will slowly erode. Language is realigned and
reconstructed to accord with the identities and contours of civilizations. A universal
religion is also very unlikely to emerge. A religious resurgence has occurred and it has
involved the intensification of religious consciousness and the rise of fundamentalist
movements. The data of table 3.3 on page 65 demonstrates increases in the proportions of
the world's population adhering to the two major religions, Islam and Christianity. In
the long run, however, Islam wins out as Christianity spreads primarily by conversion
whereas Islam spreads by conversion and reproduction. In the modern world religion is a
central, perhaps the central, force that motivates and mobilizes people. The most
fundamental divisions of humanity are in terms of ethnicity, religion, and civilizations,
which remain and spawn new conflicts.
The book proceeds to discuss why civilizations will clash and in which manner. Huntington
discusses six reasons for these conflicts and explains each accordingly. First, the book
explains, differences among civilizations are not only real; they are basic. History,
language, culture, tradition, and most important religion differentiate civilizations
from each other. These differences are far more fundamental than differences among
political ideologies and political regimes. They do not necessarily mean conflict,
however over the centuries; differences among civilizations have generated the most
prolonged and most violent conflicts. Second, the world is becoming a smaller place. The
interactions between the peoples of different civilizations are increasing; these
increasing interactions intensify civilization consciousness and awareness of differences
between civilizations and commonalties within civilizations. An example of this is seen
with North African immigrants in France who generate hostility as opposed to Catholic
Poles who are seen as good immigrants. Third, the processes of economic modernization and
social change throughout the world are separating people from longstanding local
identities. They also weaken the nation state as a source of identity. In much of the
world religion has moved to fill this gap, often in the form of movements that are
labeled fundamentalist. The revival of religion, La Revanche de Dieu, as Gilles Kepel
labeled it, provides a basis for identity and commitment that transcends national
boundaries and unites civilizations. Fourth, the growth of civilization-consciousness is
enhanced by the dual role of the West. On the one hand, the West is at a peak of power.
At the same time, however, and perhaps as a result, a return to the roots phenomenon is
occurring among non-Western civilizations. Huntington presumes a West at the peak of its
power confronting non-Wests that increasingly have the desire, the will and the resources
to shape the world in non-Western ways. Fifth, cultural characteristics and differences
are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and
economic ones. The key question used to be Which side are you on? Today it is Who are
you? A person can be half-French and half-Arab and simultaneously even a citizen of two
countries. However it is much more difficult to be half-Catholic and half-Muslim.
Finally, he proposes, economic regionalism is increasing. The proportions to total that
were intraregional rose between 1980 and 1989 from fifty one percent to fifty nine
percent in Europe, thirty three percent to thirty seven percent in East Asia, and thirty
two percent to thirty six percent in North America. The importance of regional economic
blocs is likely to continue to increase in the future. However, Japan faces difficulties
in creating an economic entity in East Asia because Japan is a society and a
civilization, which is unique to itself. However strong the trade and investment links
Japan may develop with other east Asian countries, its cultural differences with those
countries inhabit and perhaps preclude its promoting regional economic integration like
that of Europe and North America. If cultural commonality is a prerequisite for economic
integration, the principle East Asian economic bloc of the future is likely to centered
on China. As Murray Weidenbaum had observed: Despite the current Japanese dominance of
the region, the Chinese-based economy of Asia is rapidly emerging as a new epicenter for
industry, commerce and finance. 
As people define their identity in ethnic and religious terms, they are seen as us versus
them relation existing between themselves and people of different ethnicity or religion.
Differences in culture and religion create differences over policy issues, ranging from
human rights to immigration to trade and commerce to the environment. The clash of
civilizations thus occurs at two levels. At the micro-level, adjacent groups along the
fault lines between civilizations struggle, often violently, over the control of
territory and each other. At the macro-level, states from different civilizations compete
for relative military and economic power, struggle over the control of international
institutions and third parties, and competitively promote their particular political and
religious values. 
Huntington also discusses the effects of modernization and Westernization. First, he
looks at trade and the likelihood of conflict amongst countries trading with each other.
He rejects the assumption that it reduces the probability of war between nations, and
asserts that evidence actually proves the contrary. He understands the significant
expansion of international trade during the 1960s and 1970s, but stresses that this
correlation is meaningless as the world witnessed record highs in international trade in
1913 only to be followed by a global slaughter in unprecedented numbers few years later
in World War I. Economic interdependence fosters peace only when states expect that high
trade levels will continue into the foreseeable future. If states do not expect high
levels of interdependence to continue, war is likely to result. Following Huntington
identifies Western civilization and concludes that it does not represent modern
civilization since the West was the West long before it was actually modern. Western
culture is classified with seven characteristics: a classical legacy, Catholicism and
Protestantism, European languages, separation of spiritual and temporary authority, rule
of law, social pluralism, representative bodies, and individualism. Individually, almost
none of these factors were unique to the West, however the combination of them was
unique. Huntington also tries to establish the response nations will have to the West and
to modernization. He claims the expansion of the West has promoted both the modernization
and the Westernization of non-Western societies. The political and intellectual leaders
of these societies have responded to the Western impact in one or more of three ways:
rejecting both modernization and Westernization, embracing both, or embracing
modernization and rejecting Westernization. In the twentieth century improvements in
transportation and communication and global interdependence increased tremendously the
costs of exclusion. Except for small, isolated, rural, communities willing to exist at a
subsistence level, the total rejection of modernization as well as Westernization is
hardly possible in a world becoming overwhelmingly modern and highly interconnected.
Kemalism, which is the embrace of both concepts, is based on the assumptions that
modernization is desirable and necessary, that the indigenous culture is incompatible
with modernization and must be abandoned or abolished. Society must fully westernize in
order to successfully modernization and both reinforce each other and have to go
together. Finally, the Reformist approach attempts to combine modernization with the
preservation of the central values, practices, and institutions of the society's
indigenous culture. This choice has understandably been the most popular one among
non-Western elites.
As the ideological division of Europe has disappeared, the cultural division of Europe
between Western Christianity, on the one hand, and Orthodox Christianity and Islam, on
the other, has emerged. As the diagram 1.2 illustrates, the Velvet Curtain of culture has
replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology as the most significant dividing line in Europe. As
the events in Yugoslavia show, it is not only a line of difference; it is also at times a
line of bloody conflict. The Clash of Rights reviews that this century-old military
interaction between the West and Islam is unlikely to decline. In fact it could become
more violent. The Gulf War left some Arabs feeling proud that Saddam Hussein had attacked
Israel and stood up to the West. It also left many feeling humiliated and resentful of
the West's military presence in the Persian Gulf. Those relations, Huntington states, are
also complicated by demography. The spectacular population growth in Arab countries,
particularly in North Africa, has led to increase migration to Western Europe. The
movement within Western Europe toward minimizing internal boundaries has sharpened
political sensitivities with respect to this development. On both sides the interaction
between Islam and the West is seen as a clash of civilizations. M.J. Akbar, a Muslim
author states The next confrontation is definitely going to come from the Muslim world.
The modernization of Africa and the spread of Christianity, he concludes, are likely to
enhance the probability of violence along this fault line. Examples of this violence are
evident in current world affairs such as: the on-going civil war in the Sudan between
Arabs and blacks, the fighting in Chad between Libyan-supported insurgents and the
government, the tensions between Orthodox Christians and Muslims in the Horn of Africa,
and the political conflicts, recurring riots and communal violence between Muslim and
Christians in Nigeria. On the northern border of Islam, conflict has increasingly erupted
between Orthodox and Muslim peoples; including the carnage of Bosnia and Sarajevo, and
the violence between Serbs and Albanians. The historic clash between Muslims and Hindus
manifests itself now not only in the rivalry between Pakistan and India but also in
intensifying religious strife within India between increasingly militant Hindu groups and
India's substantial Muslim minority. Furthermore, with the Cold War over, the underlying
differences between China and the United States have reasserted themselves in areas such
as human rights, trade, and weapons proliferation. The differences are unlikely to be
moderated. And finally, violence also occurs between Muslims, on the one hand, and
Orthodox Serbs in the Balkans, Jews in Israel, Hindus in India, Buddhists in Burma and
Catholics in the Philippines. In every respect, Huntington believes, the Islamic bloc
from the bulge of Africa to central Asia has bloody borders.
Two pictures exist of the power of the West in relation to other civilizations. The first
is of overwhelming, triumphant, almost total Western dominance. The disintegration of the
Soviet Union removed the only serious challenger to the West and as a result the world is
and will be shaped by the goals, priorities, and interests of the principal Western
nations, with perhaps an occasional assist from Japan. The second picture of the West is
very different. It is of a civilization in decline, its share of world political,
economic, and military power going down relative to that of other civilizations. Further,
this view proposes that the West is now confronted with slow economic growth, stagnating
populations, unemployment, huge government deficits, a declining work ethic, low savings
rates, social disintegration, drugs, and crime. In the Clash of Rights, Huntington
defends the second theory as the one, which best describes reality. He believes the
West's power is declining and will continue to do so as the most significant increases in
power are occurring and will occur in Asian civilizations, particularly in China. However
this decline, he describes, is not so simple. It will occur within three major
characteristics. First it is a slow process; second this decline is highly irregular with
pauses, reversals, and some renewals; and thirdly the West's power to influence the World
is based on numerous factors such as economic, military, institutional, demographic,
political, technological, and social powers; all which are declining. In sum, Huntington
concludes the West's power is a decline in three core elements. Territory and population
are first. Westerners constitute a steadily decreasing minority of the world's
population. Furthermore, the balance between the West and other populations is also
changing. Non-Western peoples are becoming healthier, more urban, more literate, and
better educated. Next is economic product, which is been declining since the Second World
War for Westerners. This relative decline is; of course, in large part a function of the
rapid rise of East Asia. And lastly, military capability which as Huntington demonstrates
on table 4.6, page 88; that the West's military manpower, spending, forces, and
capabilities are at a significant decline whereas it is in a large rise in non-Western
nations. Huntington states:
We are witnessing the end of the progressive era dominated by Western ideologies and are
moving into an era in which multiple and diverse civilizations will interact, compete,
coexist, and accommodate each other. This is the revival of religion occurring in so many
parts of the world and most notably in the cultural resurgence in Asian and Islamic
countries generated in large part by their economic and demographic dynamism.
The Clash of Civilizations asserts that the West is in a unique situation. Countries that
for the reason of culture and power do not wish, or cannot, join the West instantly
compete with the West by developing their own economic, military, and political power.
They do this by promoting their internal development and by cooperating with other
non-Western countries. The most prominent for of this cooperation is the
Confucian-Islamic connection that has emerged to challenge Western interests, values and
power. Asian assertiveness is rooted in economic growth; Muslim assertiveness stems in
considerable measure from social mobilization and population growth. The economic
development in China and other Asian societies provides their governments with both the
incentives and the resources to become more demanding in their dealing with other
countries. Population growth in Muslim countries provides recruits for fundamentalism,
terrorism, insurgency, and migration. Economic growth strengthens Asian governments;
demographic growth threatens Muslim governments and non-Muslim societies. In general,
states belonging to one civilization that become involved in war with people from a
different civilization naturally try to rally support from other member of their own
civilization. S. Greenway has termed the kin-country syndrome, is replacing political
ideology and traditional balance of power considerations as the principal basis for
cooperation and coalitions. This was witnessed during the Gulf war, as Safar Al-Hawali
describes The West against Islam. A world of clashing civilizations, states Huntington,
is however, inevitably a world of double standards: people apply one standard to their
kin-countries and a different standard to others. With respects to the fighting in the
former Yugoslavia, Western publics manifested sympathy and support for the Bosnian
Muslims and the horrors they suffered at the hands of the Serbs. Relatively little
concern was expressed, however, over Croatian attacks on Muslims and participation in the
dismemberment of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Islamic government groups, on the other hand,
castigated the West for not coming to the defense of the Bosnians as over two dozen
Islamic countries were reported to be fighting in Bosnia. Huntington acknowledges that
conflicts and violence will also occur between states and groups within the same
civilizations. Such conflicts, however, are likely to be less intense and less likely to
expand than conflicts between civilizations. Common membership in a civilization reduces
the probability of violence in situations where it might otherwise occur. As the
conflicts in the Persian Gulf, and Bosnia continued, the positions of nations and the
cleavages between them increasingly were long civilizational lines. The next World War,
if there is one, will be a war between civilizations, Huntington concludes.
Spurred by modernization, global politics is being reconfigured along cultural lines.
Peoples and countries with similar cultures are coming together. Peoples and countries
with different cultures are coming apart. Alignments defined by ideology and superpower
relations are giving way to alignments defined by culture and civilization. Political
boundaries increasingly are redrawn to coincide with cultural ones: ethnic, religious,
and civilizational. Cultural communities are replacing Cold War blocs, and the fault
lines between civilizations are becoming the central lines of conflict in global
politics. This, Huntington asserts, is the cultural reconfiguration of global politics.
Further, he believes these cultural differences do not facilitate cooperation and
cohesion but on the contrary, they promote cleavages and conflicts for a number of
reasons. First, everyone has multiple identities, which may compete with or reinforce
each other. Second, the alienation of cultural identity creates the need for more
meaningful identities as the power of non-Western societies stimulate the revitalization
of indigenous identities and culture. Third, identity at any level-personal, tribal,
racial, or civilization can only be defined in relation to an other as opposed to the
like us. Fourth, the sources of conflict between states and groups from different
civilizations are, in large measure, those, which have always generated conflict between
groups. Fifth and finally is the prevalence of conflict. It is human to hate. Just as
most nations are aligned with a particular civilization or grouping there are others
which have difficulties aligning and finding commonalties amongst civilizations. These
nations Huntington categorizes as torn countries. The reason for this syndrome is that
these nations usually have one or more places viewed by their members as the principal
source or sources of their civilization. These sources are often located within the Core
State or states of the civilization, that is, its most powerful and culturally central
state or states. Islam, Latin America and Africa all lack core states. This lack of a
core state endangers the potential for these cultures to take a leadership role in global
politics. Globally the most important torn country is Russia. The question of whether
Russia is a part of the West or the leader of a distinct Slavic-Orthodox civilization has
been a recurring one in Russian history. In order to redefine its civilization identity,
a torn country must meet three requirements. First, its political and economic elite has
to be generally supportive of and enthusiastic about this move. Second, its public has to
be willing to acquiesce in the redefinition. Third, the dominant groups in the recipient
civilization have to be willing to embrace the convert. A similar example of these
criteria has been Mexico. Another syndrome discussed by Huntington is of a lone country.
These countries lack cultural commonality with other societies. Ethiopia, Haiti, and more
importantly Japan, are lone countries. Finally, the last syndrome mentioned is cleft
countries. This occurs when large groups belong to different civilizations causing the
populace to become deeply divided. Examples of current cleft countries are Sudan,
Nigeria, Tanzania, and Kenya. Some possible cleft countries, Huntington presumes, are
India, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Singapore, China, Philippines, Indonesia, and maybe even
Canada.
Basically, having achieved political independence, non-Western societies wish to free
themselves from Western economic, military, and cultural domination. East Asian societies
are well on their way to equaling the West economically. A general anti-Western
coalition, however, seems unlikely in the immediate future. Islamic and Sinic
civilizations differ fundamentally in terms of religion, culture, social structure,
traditions, politics, and basic assumptions at the root of their way of life. Inherently
each probably has less in common with the other than it has in common with Western
civilization. Yet in politics a common enemy creates a common interest. Islamic, and
Sinic societies which see the West as their antagonist thus have reason to cooperate with
each other against the West. Huntington states: Trust and friendship will be rare. The
overriding lesson of the history of civilizations, however, is that many things are
probable but nothing is inevitable. Civilizations can and have reformed and renewed
themselves. The central issue for the West is whether, quite apart from any external
challenges, it is capable of stopping and reversing the internal processes of decay. Can
the West renew itself or will sustained internal rot simply accelerate its end and/or
subordination to other economically and demographically more dynamic civilizations? I
feel that in the short term it is clearly in the interest of the West to promote greater
cooperation and unity within its own civilization, particularly between its European and
North American components; to incorporate into the Wes